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“Who Will Judge the Many When the Game is 
Through?”: Considering the Profound Differences 
Between Mental Health Courts and “Traditional” 
Involuntary Civil Commitment Courts 
Michael L. Perlin, Esq. 
INTRODUCTION 
For forty years, we have known that involuntary civil commitment 
hearings are—in most jurisdictions—“charades.”1 When the Supreme 
Court noted, in Parham v. J.R., that the average length of a civil 
commitment hearing ranged from 3.8 to 9.2 minutes,2 the reaction of many 
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at the Second International Conference on Non-Adversarial Justice: Integrating Theory and Practice 
as the keynote address, sponsored by the Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, Sydney, 
New South Wales, Australia, April 8, 2017; at the annual meeting of the Forensic and Correctional 
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 1. Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why 
and How Mental Disability Law Developed as It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 7 (1999). 
 2. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 n.17 (1979) (countenancing fewer procedural due process 
protections for juveniles facing civil commitment than in cases involving adults); see also Michael L. 
Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “She’s Nobody’s Child/The Law Can’t Touch Her at All”: Seeking to Bring 
Dignity to Legal Proceedings Involving Juveniles, 56 FAM. CT. REV. 79, 88 (2018) (assessing the 
extent to which Parham has contributed to the shaming and humiliation of juveniles facing psychiatric 
institutionalization). 
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who had done these cases was, “What? So long?!”3 The characterization 
of such hearings as being a “greased runway” to a state institution has 
never been disputed.4 Lawyers representing these individuals were bored 
or contemptuous;5 judges simply wanted to get cases moving; opposing 
counsel looked at their wrist watches to see when the cases would be 
done.6 
This is not news to anyone who regularly did civil commitment 
hearings at any time since 1972 (the beginning of contemporary civil 
commitment law, coinciding with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
                                                     
 3. Before I became a professor, I spent thirteen years as a lawyer representing persons with 
mental disabilities, including three years in which my focus was primarily on such individuals charged 
with a crime. In this role, when I was Deputy Public Defender in Mercer County (Trenton), NJ, I 
represented several hundred individuals at the “maximum security hospital for the criminally insane” 
in habeas corpus hearings, the forerunner to civil commitment hearings, both in individual cases and 
in a class action. Dixon v. Cahill, No. L3097 7/y-71 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973) (final order 
reprinted in MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW § 19-8 (3d 
ed. 2017) and discussed in Michael L. Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw”: The Impact of the ADA 
on the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193, 206–
07 n.94 (2000)). For the next eight years, I was director of the NJ Division of Mental Health Advocacy. 
In that role, I supervised the representation of tens of thousands of individuals facing civil commitment 
at psychiatric facilities in New Jersey. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “Infinity Goes Up on Trial”: 
Sanism, Pretextuality, and the Representation of Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 16 QUT L. REV. 
106 (2016); Michael L. Perlin, Mental Patient Advocacy by a Public Advocate, 54 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 
169 (1982). 
 4. See, e.g., Leslie Scallet, The Realities of Mental Health Advocacy: State ex rel. Memmel v. 
Mundy, in MENTAL HEALTH ADVOCACY: AN EMERGING FORCE IN CONSUMERS’ RIGHTS 79, 81 
(Louis E. Kopolow & Helene Bloom eds., 1977); Alan Schoenberger, “Voluntary” Commitment of 
Mentally Ill or Retarded Children: Child Abuse by the Supreme Court, 7 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 30–
31 (1981). 
 5. See Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “Mr. Bad Example”: Why Lawyers Need to Embrace 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Root Out Sanism in the Representation of Persons with Mental 
Disabilities, 16 WYO. L. REV. 299, 314 n.96 (2016) [hereinafter Perlin & Lynch, Mr. Bad Example]. 
[The author] had occasion to speak to private counsel who had been assigned to represent 
a patient in a county in which the New Jersey Division of Mental Health Advocacy . . . did 
not represent patients. The assigned counsel asked [the author], “Why is the State wasting 
money to pay me to do this bullshit?” 
Id. 
 6. See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 2-6.3.3, at 2-74 n.458 (“Mental disability law generally 
regulates powerless individuals represented by passive counsel in invisible court proceedings 
conducted by bored or irritated judges.”). Judges for such cases are frequently retired judges called 
back into service on “recall.” The state of New Jersey’s official policy requires judges seeking recall 
work to be willing to hear involuntary civil commitment cases. See N.J. STATE JUDICIARY, POLICY 
GOVERNING RECALL FOR TEMPORARY SERVICE WITHIN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM § 11(b) (July 19, 
2001), https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/attorneys/assets/directives/dir_12_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
8R4N-8DTV]. “Priority for approving requests for recall service will be based on the following 
factors: . . . b. Willingness to serve on a designated statewide priority for recall judges, e.g., civil 
commitment hearings, ISP, sexually violent predator cases.” Id. 
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Jackson v. Indiana7); I, and others, have written about this many times.8 
Some sixteen years ago, I wrote the following (and to the best of my 
knowledge, it has never been contradicted): “[T]he overwhelming number 
of cases involving mental disability law issues are ‘litigated’ in pitch 
darkness. Involuntary civil commitment cases are routinely disposed of in 
minutes behind closed courtroom doors.”9 
In this Article, I will contrast this shabby track record with the 
promises of those mental health courts (MHCs) that operate as problem-
solving courts are supposed to operate, and I will discuss how these courts 
may provide due process and fair hearings. I will assess—via traditional 
“compare and contrast” means—these two ways of adjudicating cases 
involving persons with mental disabilities via the models of procedural 
justice and therapeutic jurisprudence, and I will end with some thoughts 
about other topics that must be considered in this context. 
I. QUALITY OF COUNSEL AT TRADITIONAL CIVIL COMMITMENT 
HEARINGS 
If there has been any constant in modern mental disability law, “it is 
the near-universal reality that counsel assigned to represent individuals at 
involuntary civil commitment cases is likely to be ineffective.”10 We knew 
                                                     
 7. 406 U.S. 715, 729–37 (1972) (applying procedural and substantive due process protections to 
the civil commitment process). I critiqued the Parham decision in Michael L. Perlin, An Invitation to 
the Dance: An Empirical Response to Chief Justice Warren Burger’s Time-Consuming Procedural 
Minuets Theory, in Parham v. J.R., 9 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 149 (1981), reprinted in 
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT 291 (David Wexler ed., 1990) 
[hereinafter Wexler, THERAPEUTIC AGENT]; see also Perlin & Lynch, supra note 2. 
 8. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin & John Douard, “Equality, I Spoke That Word/As If a Wedding 
Vow”: Mental Disability Law and How We Treat Marginalized Persons, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 9 
(2008–2009); Perlin, supra note 1, at 6–9; Michael L. Perlin, “John Brown Went Off to War”: 
Considering Veterans’ Courts as Problem-Solving Courts, 37 NOVA L. REV. 445 (2013). 
 9. Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 425 (2000). See, e.g., JAMES A. 
HOLSTEIN, COURT-ORDERED INSANITY: INTERPRETIVE PRACTICE AND INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT, 
at xvi (1993); James A. Holstein, Court Ordered Incompetence: Conversational Organization in 
Involuntary Commitment Hearings, 35 SOC. PROBS. 459 (1988). 
 This is not to say that all states operate in the same way. In New York—not coincidentally, where 
there is a dedicated state-wide program to provide representation to the population in question—
hearings are open to the public and take substantially longer. Personal Communication with Naomi 
Weinstein, Senior Staff Attorney, Mental Hygiene Legal Services, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Oct. 22, 2016). 
 10. Michael L. Perlin, “I Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your Funeral, My Trial”: Global 
Perspective on the Right to Counsel in Civil Commitment Cases, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241, 241 
(2008) [hereinafter Perlin, Could Be Your Funeral]. On the passivity of counsel in such cases, see 
Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability 
Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39, 43 (1992). This, of course, presumes that counsel is available to 
represent these individuals. See, e.g., Alison J. Lynch & Michael L. Perlin, “Life’s Hurried Tangled 
Road”: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Why Dedicated Counsel Must Be Assigned to 
Represent Persons with Mental Disabilities in Community Settings, 35 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 353, 355–57 
(2017). Professor Heather Campbell has reminded me that in Canada, such representation is not 
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this as the modern era began.11 We knew it when some courts (the case of 
Lessard v. Schmidt12 is the perfect example) started taking more seriously 
some of the other substantive and procedural rights of persons who were 
the subjects of such hearings.13 We knew it when so few states chose to 
follow the examples of New York, New Jersey, and a handful of other 
jurisdictions14 that legislatively created regularized, dedicated, specialized 
legal services offices whose primary job was to provide representation at 
such hearings.15 We knew it when the first empirical research showed that 
most lawyers prepared much less for civil commitment cases than for other 
cases, many did not speak to clients before the hearing, and they “rarely 
                                                     
mandatory in all provinces. It is also not mandatory in all states in Australia. See Michael L. Perlin, 
Three Kinds of Therapeutic Jurisprudence (and One Kind of Not-TJ), INT’L SOC’Y FOR THERAPEUTIC 
JURIS. (Aug. 3, 2017), https://mainstreamtj.wordpress.com/2017/08/03/three-kinds-of-therapeutic- 
jurisprudence-and-one-kind-of-not-tj/ [https://perma.cc/EQ3Y-2CM8] (discussing ELEANORE 
FRITZE, THE JACK BROCKHOFF FOUND., SHINING A LIGHT BEHIND CLOSED DOORS 28–31 (Dec. 
2015), https://www.churchilltrust.com.au/media/fellows/Fritze_E_Shining_a_light_behind_closed_ 
doors.pdf [https://perma.cc/HLY9-N4MR]). 
 Also, in many U.S. jurisdictions, lawyers’ caseloads are far too heavy to allow individualized 
representation. Years ago, a study in Chicago found that a single public defender was assigned to 
handle all civil commitment cases in the city of Chicago—a prohibitive case load of forty to sixty 
cases per week and 2,000–3,000 cases per year. See Elliott Andalman & David L. Chambers, Effective 
Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 MISS. L.J. 
43, 61 (1974). When that study was replicated twenty years later, it found a caseload of 2,000 per year 
in another county (presumably in Florida). Sumner J. Sydeman et al., Procedural Justice in the Context 
of Civil Commitment: A Critique of Tyler’s Analysis, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 207, 216 n.49 
(1997). The American Bar Association takes the position that the maximum caseload should be 200, 
one-tenth of this number. See Megan Annitto, Juvenile Justice on Appeal, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 671, 
674 n.9 (2012) (citing and quoting AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT 
DEFENDANTS, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 1, 5 n.19 (2002)). 
 Beyond the scope of this paper is a consideration of an important collateral issue: that there are 
often not the community support services in place (e.g., housing and less restrictive alternative 
treatment facilities) that should be available to all who are subject to the involuntary civil commitment 
process. See Naomi M. Weinstein & Michael L. Perlin, “Who’s Pretending to Care for Him?” How 
the Endless Jail-to-Hospital-to-Street-Repeat Cycle Deprives Persons with Mental Disabilities the 
Right to Continuity of Care, WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 13–14) 
(on file with authors) [hereinafter Weinstein & Perlin, Who’s Pretending to Care for Him?]. 
 11. See, e.g., Andalman & Chambers, supra note 10, at 72 (speculating that counsel was so 
inadequate in the sample study that patients’ chances for hospital release were enhanced if no lawyer 
was present); George E. Dix, Acute Psychiatric Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in the Metropolis: 
An Empirical Study, 1968 WASH. U. L.Q. 485, 540 (1968) (noting that only two of 1,700 contested 
cases resulted in patient release). 
 12. 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1087 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (holding that a statute that fails to provide a person 
alleged to be mentally ill with adequate procedural safeguards is unconstitutional). 
 13. Scallet, supra note 4, at 81. 
 14. See, e.g., In re Judicial Commitment of C.P.K., 516 So. 2d 1323, 1325 (La. Ct. App. 1987) 
(reversing commitment order where trial court failed to comply with statute expressing explicit 
preference for representation by state Mental Health Advocacy Service and rejecting as “untenable” 
argument that trial court should be excused “since it did not know . . . whether the Service really 
existed”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123, § 23 (2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5123.60 (West 2017). 
 15. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§47.01–47.03 (McKinney 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
52:27E-55 (West 2017). 
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took an adversary role to obtain release of their clients whom psychiatrists 
had recommended for commitment.”16 And importantly, we knew it when 
it became clear that only in those jurisdictions that had dedicated counsel 
programs was there any coherent body of reported civil commitment case 
law.17 There are dedicated offices that provide top-flight legal 
representation to persons with mental disabilities in civil commitment 
hearings, but these offices represent a small percentage of those subject to 
commitment.18 
Sadly, “the quality of counsel assigned to represent individuals who 
face involuntary civil commitment to psychiatric hospitals is, in most 
United States jurisdictions, mediocre or worse.”19 The data tells us that, in 
many jurisdictions, counsel is “woefully inadequate—disinterested, 
uninformed, roleless, and often hostile.”20 Startlingly, “this reality goes 
almost unmentioned in the legal literature.”21 
                                                     
 16. Virginia Aldigé Hiday, Are Lawyers Enemies of Psychiatrists? A Survey of Civil 
Commitment Counsel and Judges, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 323, 326 (1983). 
 17. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: Sanism in Clinical 
Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 708–09 (2003). 
A contrast between the development of case law in Virginia and Minnesota is especially 
instructive. Notwithstanding the fact that Virginia’s population is approximately 15% 
greater than Minnesota’s, Virginia had only two published litigated civil cases on questions 
of mental hospitalization during the decade from 1976 to 1986, while Minnesota had at 
least 101 such cases in the same period. Significantly, Minnesota has a tradition of 
providing vigorous counsel to persons with mental disabilities, while Virginia does not. 
Id. 
 18. See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, §§ 6-4.2 to 6-4.3. 
 19. Perlin, Could Be Your Funeral, supra note 10, at 243. In a white paper that I prepared for the 
American University School of Public Affairs’ Justice Programs Office on the question of the quality 
of representation of criminal defendants with mental disabilities, I focused on several issues that 
required attention in determining adequacy of counsel in cases involving this population: the “fear of 
faking,” the likelihood of undiagnosed or misdiagnosed disabilities, and the impact of prescribed 
medications on mental functioning. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, AM. UNIV., JUSTICE PROGRAMS OFFICE, 
REPRESENTING CLIENTS WITH MENTAL HEALTH AND/OR COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENTS IN TREATMENT 
COURTS 3 (2016), http://www.american.edu/spa/jpo/initiatives/drug-court/upload/Perlin-Mental-
Impairments-7-8-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/DM26-89EL]. Certainly, the vast majority of lawyers 
appointed episodically or randomly to represent persons with mental disabilities at civil commitment 
hearings invariably miss these issues. 
 20. Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won’t Even Say What It Is I’ve Got”: 
The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 
738 (2005). See also Henry A. Dlugacz & Christopher Wimmer, The Ethics of Representing Clients 
with Limited Competency in Guardianship Proceedings, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 331, 
353–54 (2011). 
There are also institutional pressures: The attorney who depends on the goodwill of others 
in the system (e.g., judges, state attorneys, or prosecutors) may pull his punches, even 
unwittingly, in order to retain credibility for future interactions (which he would put to use 
for his future clients). Judges want cases resolved. 
Id. 
 21. Perlin, Could Be Your Funeral, supra note 10, at 243. In 2008, the author noted that a 
Westlaw search of “(adequacy effectiveness) +3 counsel /s ‘civil commitment’” revealed no articles 
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Counsel on the “other side of the table” does not have a sterling track 
record either. In his concurrence in O’Connor v. Donaldson,22 then-Chief 
Justice Warren Burger noted that, at retrial, “I would hope these sensitive 
and important issues would have the benefit of more effective presentation 
and articulation on behalf of petitioner [defendant/state psychiatrist].”23 In 
this context, Professor David Wexler has noted that “it does not appear 
that the state’s public protection and therapeutic interests are being 
advanced under a scheme defendable as a coherent policy of appropriate 
advocacy in mental health cases.”24 Importantly, in the same article—
written nearly thirty-five years ago—Wexler noted that “discussions of 
advocacy in mental health law have rarely touched on the appropriate role 
of attorneys representing commitment petitioners or state hospitals.”25 As 
Professor Wenona Whitfield has observed, “state’s attorneys . . . have 
little incentive or interest in making this area of the law their specialty.”26 
Further, judges “generally have little judicial experience and little 
incentive to develop expertise in this area.”27 Their lack of interest 
“conveys the message that patients’ rights . . . are not important.”28 Simply 
put, judges subordinate mental disability law issues (a reflection and 
                                                     
other than those that he had written. Id. at 243 n.14. When the same search was repeated last year, in 
addition to those articles (and ones citing a different article by the author, see Michael L. Perlin & 
Deborah A. Dorfman, Is It More than “Dodging Lions and Wastin’ Time”? Adequacy of Counsel, 
Questions of Competence, and the Judicial Process in Individual Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 114 (1996)), the search revealed only two others: Grant H. Morris, “Let’s 
Do the Time Warp Again”: Assessing the Competence of Counsel in Mental Health Conservatorship 
Proceedings, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 283 (2009) and Joseph Frueh, The Anders Brief in Appeals from 
Civil Commitment, 118 YALE L.J. 272 (2008) (search performed Aug. 29, 2016). 
 22. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
 23. Id. at 578 n.1. 
 24. David B. Wexler, Inappropriate Patient Confinement and Appropriate State Advocacy, 45 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 202 (1982). 
 25. Id. at 193. Wexler further suggests, in this context, that state counsel often engages in 
pretextual advocacy by counsel automatically assuming an adversarial role at release hearings and 
advocating needless or inappropriate confinement. Id. at 198–200; see also Deborah A. Dorfman, 
Through a Therapeutic Jurisprudence Filter: Fear and Pretextuality in Mental Disability Law, 10 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 805, 814 (1993) (discussing pretextual advocacy by state counsel in this 
context as well). 
 26. Wenona Whitfield, Capacity, Competency, and Courts: The Illinois Experience, 14 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 385, 405 (2004). 
 27. Id. at 404. My personal experience decades ago was that judges often cut off my attempts at 
cross-examination, both on voir dire of experts and on the experts’ opinions of cases. An attorney 
whom I know well, who has requested anonymity, and who does similar cases now reported: “[There 
are] judges who would give more time to petitioner’s side and less time to us (to the point where I 
would start timing how long petitioner’s attorney got to ask questions so that I could say my cross 
should be allowed to be at least that long).” Personal Communication to Author (Oct. 23, 2016). 
 28. Michael L. Perlin, Keri K. Gould & Deborah A. Dorfman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and 
the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to 
Redemption? 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 80, 116 (1995). 
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extension of their subordination of mentally disabled persons).29 This 
subordination translates into a failure to inform patients of their rights at 
such hearings. A study by Charles D. Parry and Eric Turkheimer revealed 
that, at the patient’s initial hearing, fewer than one-third of judges told 
patients of their right to counsel, fewer than one-fourth told patients of 
their right to voluntary status, and about two-fifths told patients of their 
right to appeal; by the second review hearing after six to twelve months in 
the hospital, less than five percent of judges mentioned the right to counsel 
and less than eight percent mentioned voluntary admissions, while fifteen 
percent referred to the right to appeal.30 There is no contesting Professor 
Sarah Gordon’s conclusion that “civil commitment proceedings tend to be 
short and perfunctory.”31 
Judges typically defer to the judgments of state experts32 without any 
acknowledgement of the robust, valid, and reliable evidence that tells us 
                                                     
 29. Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Understanding the Sanist and Pretextual 
Bases of Mental Disability Law, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 369, 377 (1994). 
 30. Charles D. Parry & Eric Turkheimer, Length of Hospitalization and Outcome of Commitment 
and Recommitment Hearings, 43 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 65, 66 (1992). Remarkably, this 
article has not subsequently been cited in the legal literature in nearly twenty years. See Stephanie 
Proctor Miller, Keeping the Promise: The ADA and Employment Discrimination on the Basis of 
Psychiatric Disability, 85 CAL. L. REV. 701, 703 n.14 (1997); Sydeman et al., supra note 10, at 208 
n.7. 
 31. Sara Gordon, The Danger Zone: How the Dangerousness Standard in Civil Commitment 
Proceedings Harms People with Serious Mental Illness, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 657, 678 (2016). 
On how civil commitment threatens a person’s liberty and dignity with “equally drastic consequences 
as those associated with criminal prosecutions,” see People v. Hurtado, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 186, 197 
(Cal. 2002), cert. denied, 583 U.S. 963 (2003), as discussed in Meehan Rasch, California’s Dueling 
Harmless Error Standards: Approaches to Federal Constitutional Error in Civil Proceedings and 
Establishing the Proper Test for Dependency, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 433, 448 (2008). 
 32. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 21, at 314–15 (“[D]espite the fallibility of psychiatric testimony, 
judges and juries, serving as fact finders in civil commitment and conservatorship proceedings, 
typically defer to psychiatric judgments that the person has a mental disorder and that the mental 
disorder meets the statutory standard for commitment or a conservatorship.”). The only two studies of 
judges’ views on this question found that judges consider expert testimony to be the most important 
factor in their commitment decisions. See Stephanie Evans & Karen Salekin, Involuntary Civil 
Commitment: Communicating with the Court Regarding “Danger to Other,” 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
325, 326 (2014). 
 Most courts that have considered the question have agreed that constitutional due process in a 
civil commitment hearing “includes the right to an independent psychiatric examination.” In re 
Gannon, 301 A.2d 493, 494 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1973). See Scott F. Uhler, The Constitutional Right of the 
Indigent Facing Involuntary Civil Commitment to an Independent Psychiatric Examination, 20 
AKRON L. REV. 71, 72 (1986). See generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 6-9, at 6-104 to 6-
106.1. But see Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29, 36–37 (2d Cir. 1992) (affirming a trial court opinion 
holding that the Due Process Clause does not confer an absolute right to state-provided psychiatric 
assistance at involuntary civil commitment hearings and mandating such a right only when the hearing 
judge determines that expert testimony “is necessary to a reliable assessment of a patient”). 
There are no statistics available, but the forty years I have spent litigating these cases and observing 
them in multiple jurisdictions has made it clear to me that in most venues, such expert witnesses are 
virtually never engaged. But see Stefan Sjöström, Maritha Jacobsson & Anna Hollander, Collegiality, 
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how imprecise clinical predictions of dangerousness often are.33 By doing 
so, they allow “psychiatrist experts [to] actually become the decision-
makers in the civil commitment process,”34 serving as “rubber stamps of 
psychiatrists’ testimony.”35 As Professor Gordon points out, “civil 
commitment proceedings may not be given priority by judges with busy 
caseloads, who may therefore lack an incentive to carefully scrutinize 
psychiatrists’ recommendations.”36 
What I have reported on here is all infinitely depressing, but it is not 
new; nor is the lack of interest in the subject matter new. The Scallet 
article—the first using the phrase “greased runway” in this context37—is 
nearly forty years old. Important pieces, such as Wexler’s,38 on the role of 
the state in this context have been cited only a handful of times. There has 
been no discernable impact of studies such as the one done by Parry and 
Turkheimer.39 In short, in the nearly forty years since I started writing 
about this topic (a topic to which I continue to return),40 very little has 
changed in the context of involuntary civil commitment trials. They 
remain, in the words of the eminent forensic psychiatrist Paul Appelbaum, 
                                                     
Therapy and Mediation—The Contribution of Experts in Swedish Mental Health Law, 6 LAWS, no. 1, 
2017, at 1, http://www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/6/1/2/htm [https://perma.cc/9AQN-4XA9] (criticizing 
lack of independence on part of court-appointed psychiatrists in Swedish civil commitment cases). 
 33. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 323–24 (1993). There are “difficulties inherent in 
diagnosis of mental illness. It is thus no surprise that many psychiatric predictions of future violent 
behavior by the mentally ill are inaccurate.” Id. This has been known for decades. See, e.g., JOHN 
MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL TECHNIQUES 92 (1981) 
(two out of three predictions of dangerousness by psychiatrists and psychologists are inaccurate); 
Joseph J. Cocozza & Henry J. Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: 
Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084, 1096–97 (1976). Clinicians have been 
found to be no better than chance when it came to predicting violence among female patients. See 
JOHN MONAHAN, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, MENTAL ILLNESS AND VIOLENT CRIME 1–2 (Oct. 1996). 
 34. William M. Brooks, The Tail Still Wags the Dog: The Pervasive and Inappropriate Influence 
by the Psychiatric Profession on the Civil Commitment Process, 86 N.D. L. REV. 259, 285 (2010); see 
also Robert A. Brooks, Psychiatrists’ Opinions About Involuntary Civil Commitment: Results of a 
National Survey, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 219, 219 (2007) [hereinafter Brooks, Psychiatrists’ 
Opinions]. 
 35. Brooks, Psychiatrists’ Opinions, supra note 34, at 220. 
 36. Gordon, supra note 31, at 678 (citing Paul S. Appelbaum, Civil Commitment from a Systems 
Perspective, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 61, 66–67 (1992)). 
 37. Scallet, supra note 4. 
 38. Wexler, supra note 24. 
 39. Parry & Turkheimer, supra note 30. 
 40. Compare Michael L. Perlin & Robert L. Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the Representation of 
Individuals in the Commitment Process, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161 (1982), with Michael L. 
Perlin & Naomi M. Weinstein, “Said I, ‘But You Have No Choice’”: Why a Lawyer Must Ethically 
Honor a Client’s Decision About Mental Health Treatment Even if It Is Not What S/he Would Have 
Chosen, 15 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 73 (2016–2017). I first discussed these issues in 
Michael L. Perlin, Representing Individuals in the Commitment and Guardianship Process, in 1 
LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 497 (Paul Friedman ed., 1979). 
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the “disfavored stepchild in the large family of concerns that must be 
addressed by the justice system.”41 
II. THE PROMISE OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS 
However, consider next the parallel universe of MHCs.42 There is no 
question that one of the most important developments in the past two 
decades in the way that criminal defendants with mental disabilities are 
treated in the criminal process has been the creation and expansion of 
MHCs, one kind of “problem-solving court.”43 The creation of these courts 
is particularly critical as we—tardily—begin to come to grips with the 
ways that persons with mental disabilities are disproportionately arrested 
for “nuisance crimes” and the significance of MHCs grows.44 There is a 
wide range of dispositional alternatives available to judges in these cases45 
and an even wider range of judicial attitudes.46 And the entire concept of 
MHCs is certainly not without controversy.47 
There is no question, however, that MHCs offer a new approach—
perhaps a radically new approach—to the problems at hand.48 They 
                                                     
 41. Appelbaum, supra note 36, at 66 (as quoted in Gordon, supra note 31, at 678). 
 42. See generally Michael L. Perlin, “The Judge, He Cast His Robe Aside”: Mental Health 
Courts, Dignity and Due Process, 3 MENTAL HEALTH L. & POL’Y J. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Perlin, Cast 
His Robe]; Michael L. Perlin, “There Are No Trials Inside the Gates of Eden”: Mental Health Courts, 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dignity, and the Promise of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, in COERCIVE CARE: LAW AND POLICY 193 (Bernadette McSherry & Ian Freckelton, 
eds., 2013) [hereinafter Perlin, Gates of Eden]. 
 43. See, e.g., Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, 23 LAW 
& POL’Y, 125, 127 (2001); Greg Berman & Aubrey Fox, The Future of Problem-Solving Justice: An 
International Perspective, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS 1, 3 (2010); see also Ursula 
Castellano, The Politics of Benchcraft: The Role of Judges in Mental Health Courts, 42 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 398, 398 (2017). 
 44. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “Had to Be Held Down by Big Police”: A 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective on Interactions Between Police and Persons with Mental 
Disabilities, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 685, 687–89 (2016) [hereinafter Perlin & Lynch, Big Police]; 
Lynch & Perlin, supra note 10; Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “To Wander Off in Shame”: 
Deconstructing the Shaming and Shameful Arrest Policies of Urban Police Departments in Their 
Treatment of Persons with Mental Disabilities, in POWER, HUMILIATION AND VIOLENCE (Daniel 
Rothbart ed., forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter Perlin & Lynch, To Wander Off in Shame]. On the lack 
of continuity of care in such cases, see Weinstein & Perlin, Who’s Pretending to Care for Him? supra 
note 10. 
 45. See, e.g., Henry J. Steadman et al., From Referral to Disposition: Case Processing in Seven 
Mental Health Courts, 23 BEHAV. SCI. LAW 215, 220–21 (2005). 
 46. See, e.g., Michael S. King, Should Problem-Solving Courts Be Solution-Focused Courts?, 
80 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1005, 1008 (2011). 
 47. See, e.g., Tammy Seltzer, A Misguided Attempt to Address the Criminal Justice System’s 
Unfair Treatment of People with Mental Illness, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 570, 576 (2005). For 
a recent—and sobering—empirical critique of such courts in one jurisdiction, see Johnston & Flynn, 
infra note 84. 
 48. Some jurisdictions are beginning to seek out other alternative and complementary solutions 
to these issues. For recently-passed New York City local laws addressing the issue of mental health in 
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become even more significant because of their articulated focus on 
dignity,49 as well as their embrace of therapeutic jurisprudence, their focus 
on procedural justice, and their use of the principles of restorative justice.50 
It is time to restructure the dialogue about MHCs and to begin to take 
seriously the potential ameliorative impact of such courts on the ultimate 
disposition of all cases involving criminal defendants with mental 
disabilities.51 
It needs to be stressed that MHCs are set up differently in different 
jurisdictions. There are now over 375 such courts in operation in the 
                                                     
the criminal system, see, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., Law Number 2016/124 (Oct. 18 2016), 
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2735148&GUID=44E35DA3-1843-4456-
95B6-511D0FF7EFB7 [https://perma.cc/8B2W-ZBMJ]; N.Y.C., N.Y., Law Number 2016/123 (Oct. 
18 2016), http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2683868&GUID=50FF659A-
5D11-42BC-A364-C15155C237CC&Options=&Search= [https://perma.cc/N89H-VMNX]. See 
generally Perlin & Lynch, Big Police, supra note 44; Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 40. For other 
new and innovative options being pursued in New York City, see THE CITY OF N.Y., THRIVE NYC: A 
ROADMAP FOR MENTAL HEALTH FOR ALL (Oct. 2016), https://thrivenyc.cityofnewyork.us/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/ThriveNYC.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6HM-35PM]. 
 49. See Ginger Lerner-Wren, Mental Health Courts: Serving Justice and Promoting Recovery, 
19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 577, 593 (2010) (explaining dignity in the context of MHCs). 
 50. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAW 88–96 (2013) [hereinafter PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY] 
(discussing restorative justice); Jessica Burns, A Restorative Justice Model for Mental Health Courts, 
23 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 427, 447–54 (2014); Thomas L. Hafemeister, Sharon G. Garner & 
Veronica E. Bath, Forging Links and Renewing Ties: Applying the Principles of Restorative and 
Procedural Justice to Better Respond to Criminal Offenders with a Mental Disorder, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 
147, 201–02 (2012) (on procedural justice); Henry J. Steadman et al., Mental Health Courts: Their 
Promise and Unanswered Questions, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 457, 457–58 (2001) (discussing 
therapeutic jurisprudence in this context). On the relationship between these three approaches, see 
PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY, supra note 50, at 96–98; Michael L. Perlin, Considering the 
“Alternative Jurisprudences” as a Tool of Social Change to Reduce Humiliation and Uphold Dignity 
(2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.humiliationstudies.org/documents/PerlinNY12- 
AlternativeJurisprudences.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NZX-TKTC] (paper presented to the 20th Annual 
Conference of the Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies Network). 
 51. On the utility of MHCs in other jurisdictions, see generally Penelope Weller, Taking a 
Reflexive Turn: Non-Adversarial Justice and Mental Health Review Tribunals, 37 MONASH U. L. REV. 
82 (2011) (Austl.); Katey Thom, New Zealand Mental Health Review Tribunal Characteristics and 
Outcomes 1993–2011, 22 AUSTRALASIAN PSYCHIATRY 341 (2014) (N.Z.). On why the proposed 
Disability Rights Tribunal for Asia and the Pacific should, in part, operate under these principles, see 
generally Michael L. Perlin, Promoting Social Change in Asia and the Pacific: The Need for a 
Disability Rights Tribunal to Give Life to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1 (2012); Michael L. Perlin & Mehgan Gallagher, Why a 
Disability Rights Tribunal Must Be Premised on Therapeutic Jurisprudence Principles, 10 PSYCHOL. 
INJ. & L. 244 (2017); Yoshikazu Ikehara, Presentation at the International Conference on the Disability 
Rights Tribunal in Asia & the Pacific, What Is the DRTAP Project and Its Future?, slides 11–17 (Oct. 
22, 2010), http://slideplayer.com/slide/6189878/ [https://perma.cc/8QTF-R9S3] (discussing all 
statutes). 
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United States,52 some dealing solely with misdemeanors,53 some dealing 
solely with nonviolent offenders,54 and some dealing with no such 
restrictions.55 
Although there is no single prototype, virtually all MHCs include a 
special docket handled by a particular judge, with the primary goal of 
diverting defendants from the criminal justice system and into treatment.56 
MHCs are premised on team approaches;57 representatives from justice 
and treatment agencies assist the judge in screening offenders to determine 
whether they would present a risk of violence if released to the community, 
devising appropriate treatment plans, and supervising and monitoring the 
individual’s performance in treatment.58 The MHC judge functions as part 
                                                     
 52. Drug Treatment Courts by State, NAT’L DRUG CT. RESOURCE CTR., 
http://www.ndcrc.org/content/how-many-problem-solving-courts-are-there [https://perma.cc/FP6Z-
RBMK] (as cited in Donald M. Linhorst & P. Ann Dirks-Linhorst, Mental Health Courts: 
Development, Outcomes, and Future Challenges, JUDGES’ J., Spring 2015, at 22, 22). 
 53. See, e.g., Ursula Castellano, Courting Compliance: Case Managers as “Double Agents” in 
the Mental Health Court, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 484, 490 (2011). 
 54. See, e.g., Julie Grachek, The Insanity Defense in the Twenty-First Century: How Recent 
United States Supreme Court Case Law Can Improve the System, 81 IND. L.J. 1479, 1495 (2006). 
 55. See, e.g., E. Leah Johnston, Theorizing Mental Health Courts, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 519, 521 
(2012). See generally Carol Fisler, Building Trust and Managing Risk: A Look at a Felony Mental 
Health Court, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 587 (2005) (on the expansion of these courts to include 
felony prosecutions). 
 56. Roger A. Boothroyd et al., The Broward Mental Health Court: Process, Outcomes, and 
Service Utilization, 26 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 55, 55 (2003). At least one evaluation of such courts 
has concluded “most . . . defendants have been ‘nuisance’ offenders who have a high incidence of drug 
co-morbidity, treatment plan noncompliance, and recidivism . . . . Their high recidivism rate and the 
problem of severe jail overcrowding made the mental health court experiment especially attractive to 
some county policy makers.” Gerald Nora, Prosecutor As “Nurse Ratched”? Misusing Criminal 
Justice as Alternative Medicine, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2007, at 18, 22. Individuals before MHCs are also 
often in need of legal services dealing with matters such as housing or domestic issues. Beyond the 
scope of this paper is an inquiry into how the problem-solving courts that have been created to deal 
with these problems could best be integrated with MHCs. See Perlin & Gallagher, supra note 51 
(relying upon, inter alia, Raymond H. Brescia, Beyond Balls and Strikes: Towards a Problem-Solving 
Ethic in Foreclosure Proceedings, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 305 (2009)); Raymond L. Pianka, 
Community Control Supervision of Building Code Offenders in Cleveland’s Housing Court: Making 
the Most of Ohio’s Direct Sentencing for Misdemeanors, 46 U. MEM. L. REV. 903 (2016)). 
 57. See, e.g., Arthur J. Lurigio & Jessica Snowden, Putting Therapeutic Jurisprudence into 
Practice: The Growth, Operations, and Effectiveness of Mental Health Court, 30 JUST. SYS. J. 196, 
210–11 (2009); Marlee E. Moore & Virginia A. Hiday, Mental Health Court Outcomes: A Comparison 
of Re-Arrest and Re-Arrest Severity Between Mental Health Court and Traditional Court Participants, 
30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 660 (2006). For a discussion of variances in team approaches, see Sheryl 
Kubiak, Liz Tillander & Bradley Ray, Assessing the Role of Legal Actors Across Eight Mental Health 
Courts, 17 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 301, 304 (2013). For an article urging that MHCs be employed 
at the pre-adjudication level of the criminal court process, see generally Caitlin T. Harrington, 
Breaking the Cycle and Stepping out of the “Revolving Door”: Why the Pre-Adjudication Model Is 
the Way Forward for Illinois Mental Health Courts, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 319 (2013). 
 58. Bruce J. Winick, Outpatient Commitment: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 9 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 107, 125–26 (2003). On the role of jail as a potential sanction in the cases 
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of a mental health team that assesses the individual’s treatment needs59 and 
decides whether he or she can be safely released to the community.60 The 
team formulates a treatment plan, and a court-employed case manager and 
court monitor track the individual’s participation in the treatment program 
and submit periodic reports to the judge concerning his or her progress. 
Participants are required to report to the court periodically so the judge can 
monitor treatment compliance, and additional status review hearings are 
held on an as-needed basis.61 
To serve effectively in this sort of court setting and to best achieve 
the objectives of these courts,62 the judge needs to develop enhanced 
interpersonal skills and awareness of a variety of psychological techniques 
to persuade the individual to accept treatment and motivate him or her to 
participate effectively in it.63 The judge must be able to build trust and 
manage risk.64  
                                                     
of non-compliant defendants, see Allison Redlich et al., Patterns and Practice in Mental Health 
Courts: A National Survey, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 347, 355–56 (2006). 
 59. See Shauhin Talesh, Mental Health Court Judges as Dynamic Risk Managers: A New 
Conceptualization of the Role of Judges, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 93, 96 (2007). 
[W]ith the assistance of team members—including the public defender, prosecutor, and 
behavioral and mental health specialists—the judge performs the following three tasks: (1) 
he conducts a risk assessment in which he evaluates the defendant’s potential to harm 
himself and the public; (2) he evaluates and implements a treatment plan designed to 
manage and reallocate the defendant’s risk; and (3) he monitors the risk over a period of 
time, often requiring frequent return visits by the defendant. 
Id. 
 60. On the often-conflicting roles of case managers in MHCs, see Castellano, supra note 53, at 
490–91. On how caseworkers, in other contexts, transform “traditional courtroom justice,” see 
URSULA CASTELLANO, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE ROLE OF NONPROFIT CASEWORKERS IN 
PRETRIAL RELEASE PROGRAMS 9 (2011). 
 61. Susan Stefan & Bruce J. Winick, A Dialogue on Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 507, 520–21 (2005). For a recent article articulating strategies to optimize criminal justice–
treatment collaborations, see J. Steven Lamberti, Preventing Criminal Recidivism Through Mental 
Health and Criminal Justice Collaboration, 67 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1206 (2016). On how the 
adoption of a consumer-participation model in MHCs can improve mental health court participants’ 
capacity for voluntary participation, see McDaniel M. Kelly, Rehabilitation Through Empowerment: 
Adopting the Consumer-Participation Model for Treatment Planning in Mental Health Courts, 66 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 584 (2015). 
 62. Castellano, supra note 43, at 400. 
 63. Winick, supra note 58, at 126 (citing Carrie Petrucci, Respect as a Component in the Judge–
Defendant Interaction in a Specialized Domestic Violence Court that Utilizes Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 263 (2002)). On the “collateral institutional authority of the judge” 
in MHCs, see Eric J. Miller, The Therapeutic Effects of Managerial Reentry Courts, 30 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 127, 128 (2008). On the way that judgmental descriptive language can adversely affect the work 
of such courts in civil cases, see generally Ian Freckelton, Distractors and Distressors in Involuntary 
Status Decision-Making, 12 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 88 (2005). 
 64. Fisler, supra note 55, at 587. On the significance of trust in the context of youth and family 
courts, see generally Karni Perlman, It Takes Two for TJ: Correlation Between Bench and Bar 
Attitudes Towards Therapeutic Jurisprudence—An Israeli Perspective, 33 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 351 
(2008). 
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These skills include the ability to convey empathy and respect, 
communicate effectively with the individual, listen to what the individual 
has to say (thereby fulfilling the individual’s need for voice and 
validation), earn the individual’s trust and confidence, and engage in 
motivational interviewing and various other techniques designed to 
encourage the individual to accept treatment and comply with it.65 Judges 
in such courts must have the capacity to “break free from the statutory 
shackles that ‘transformed them into mid-level bureaucrats.’”66 It is also 
far more likely that these judges will be culturally competent and thus able 
to “unpack” the testimony of persons subject to civil commitment who do 
not come from the mainstream culture.67 These courts provide “nuanced” 
approaches68 and may signal a “fundamental shift” in the criminal justice 
system.69 According to former Judge Randal Fritzler, a successful mental 
health court thus needs: (1) a therapeutic environment and dedicated team; 
(2) an environment free from stigmatizing labels; (3) opportunities for 
deferred sentences and diversion away from the criminal system; (4) the 
least restrictive alternatives; (5) decision-making that is interdependent; 
(6) coordinated treatment, and (7) a review process that is meaningful.70 It 
                                                     
 65. For a thoughtful critique of MHCs, see Johnston, supra note 55. On the role of the legislature 
in insuring the success of such courts, see Sheila Moheb, Jamming the Revolving Door: Legislative 
Setbacks for Mental Health Court Systems in Virginia, 14 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 29, 38–41 (2010). 
 66. Castellano, supra note 43, at 399 (quoting, in part, Richard Boldt & Jana Singer, Juristocracy 
in the Trenches: Problem-Solving Judges and Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Drug Treatment Courts 
and Unified Family Courts, 65 MD. L. REV. 82, 84 (2006)). 
 67. See Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 40, at 100 (“Cultural competence is a key component in 
providing effective representation and resolving any ethical dilemmas that may arise in elder law, just 
as it is in mental disability law.”); see also, e.g., Ruby Dhand, Creating a Cultural Analysis Tool for 
the Implementation of Ontario’s Civil Mental Health Laws, 45 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 25, 32 (2016) 
(recommending further that cultural and other intersectional factors be probed during the civil 
commitment hearing processes). See generally Michael L. Perlin & Valerie R. McClain, “Where Souls 
Are Forgotten”: Cultural Competencies, Forensic Evaluations and International Human Rights, 15 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 257 (2009); Casey Schutte, Mandating Cultural Competence Training for 
Dependency Attorneys, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 564 (2014). 
 For a discussion on how the public psychiatric system disproportionately marginalizes persons 
who are racial minorities, see Michael L. Perlin & Heather Ellis Cucolo, “Tolling for the Aching Ones 
Whose Wounds Cannot Be Nursed”: The Marginalization of Racial Minorities and Women in 
Institutional Mental Disability Law, 20 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 431 (2017). 
 68. Patricia C. McManus, A Therapeutic Jurisprudential Approach to Guardianship of Persons 
with Mild Cognitive Impairment, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 591, 598 (2006). 
 69. Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Mental Health Courts and the Trend Toward a Rehabilitative 
Justice System, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1168, 1176–77 (2008). 
 70. Randal B. Fritzler, 10 Key Components of a Criminal Mental Health Court, reprinted in 
JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS 118, 118–21 
(Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler eds., 2003); Randal Fritzler, How One Misdemeanor Mental 
Health Court Incorporates Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Preventive Law, and Restorative Justice, in 
MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE: POLICY, PRACTICE, 
ADMINISTRATION 14-1, at 14-18 (Jacqueline Moore ed., 2003) (“The [mental health court] must avoid 
contributing negative stigma to its clients.”); see also Georgia Lee Sims, The Criminalization of 
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is essential that such courts be free of the “pretextual dishonesty”71 that is 
so often the hallmark of judicial proceedings in cases of individuals with 
mental disabilities.72 
Because MHCs can divert persons with mental disabilities out of the 
criminal justice system (where they are likely to be treated as third- or 
fourth-class citizens, if those terms have any meaningful content or 
context),73 MHCs make it less likely that the person with mental 
disabilities will suffer at the hands of others because of that status.74 By 
way of example, Sana Loue concludes that sanist biases may be reduced 
by the establishment of MHCs, staffed by a “sensitive” judiciary.75 A study 
of Judge Ginger Lerner-Wren’s MHC in Broward County concluded that 
participants in that court self-reported coercion levels lower than almost 
any comparable measure of perceived coercion previously reported in the 
literature.76 The actual, real-life experiences of the litigants in cases before 
                                                     
Mental Illness: How Theoretical Failures Create Real Problems in the Criminal Justice System, 62 
VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1079 (2009). 
 71. I define “pretextuality” as the ways in which courts accept (either implicitly or explicitly) 
testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (and frequently meretricious) decision-
making. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “Simplify You, Classify You”: Stigma, Stereotypes and Civil 
Rights in Disability Classification Systems, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 607, 621 (2009). 
 72. See Ian Freckelton, Ideological Divarication in Civil Commitment Decision-Making, 10 
PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 390, 395 (2003); Ian Freckelton, Mental Health Review Tribunal 
Decision-Making: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Lens, 10 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 44, 59 (2003) 
(citing Michael L. Perlin, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 59–60 (2000)); 
Michael L. Perlin, Preface to INVOLUNTARY DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL COMMITMENT, at xxxiii, xxxiii–xxxvi (Kate Diesfeld & Ian 
Freckelton eds., 2003). 
 73. For an analysis of court diversion from a critical disability studies perspective discussing 
how diversion programs in New South Wales ignore questions of social complexity in identifying 
those to be diverted, see Linda Steele, Leanne Dowse & Julian Trofimova, Who Is Diverted? Moving 
Beyond Diagnosed Impairment Towards a Social and Political Analysis of Diversion, 38 SYDNEY L. 
REV. 179, 206 (2016). 
 74. Terry Carney et al., Mental Health Tribunals: “TJ” Implications of Weighing Fairness, 
Freedom, Protection and Treatment, 17 J. JUD. ADMIN. 46, 54 (2007); Risdon Slate, From the 
Jailhouse to Capitol Hill: Impacting Mental Health Court Legislation and Defining What Constitutes 
a Mental Health Court, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 6, 6 (2003). 
 75. Sana Loue, The Involuntary Civil Commitment of Mentally Ill Persons in the United States 
and Romania, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 211, 235 n.120 (2002). On sanism in the context of MHCs, see Perlin, 
Gates of Eden, supra note 42, at 204–15, and Perlin, Cast His Robe, supra note 42, at 31–32. I define 
sanism as irrational prejudice of the same quality and character as other irrational prejudices that cause 
(and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry 
that infects the entire legal process. Michael L. Perlin, On Sanism, 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 374–75 
(1992). It is also not unreasonable to suggest that a diminution of sanism might, as a side-benefit, bring 
additional, new lawyers to this area, willing to dedicate themselves to the representation of this 
population. See generally Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, How Teaching About Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Can Be a Tool of Social Justice, and Lead Law Students to Personally and Socially 
Rewarding Careers: Sexuality and Disability as a Case Example, 16 NEV. L.J. 209, 216 (2015). 
 76. Norman G. Poythress et al., Perceived Coercion and Procedural Justice in the Broward 
Mental Health Court, 25 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 517, 529 (2002); see also David Tait, The Ritual 
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Judge Lerner-Wren thus demonstrate that an MHC can be a non-coercive, 
dignified experience that provides procedural justice and therapeutic 
jurisprudence to those before it.77 In such courts, defendants participate 
more actively and directly than in typical criminal courts, often speaking 
directly with the judge instead of sitting silently while their defense 
attorney speaks for them.78 Treatment courts that provide the most time 
and attention from the presiding judge have been shown to be more 
successful.79 Professor Vicki Lens underscores the importance of a judge 
who “buys into” the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ): “[E]ven 
a well-resourced problem-solving court may not work if the judge fails to 
adopt TJ and other problem-solving strategies effectively.”80 
                                                     
Environment of the Mental Health Tribunal Hearing: Inquiries and Reflections, 10 PSYCHIATRY 
PSYCHOL. & L. 91, 94–95 (2003). Successful judges in MHCs will typically demonstrate a sort of 
“charismatic authority,” seen by Professor Castellano as “an essential element of judges’ ability to 
achieve the complex tasks of building trust and managing risk among chronic reoffenders.” Castellano, 
supra note 43, at 402; see also Fisler, supra note 55 (discussing the backgrounds of the first problem-
solving court judges in New York). See generally Talesh, supra note 59. Looking specifically at the 
database that has developed around Judge Lerner-Wren’s court, I have sought to rebut the argument 
that mental health court judges are “too dependent on the aura of the charismatic judge” in Perlin, Cast 
Your Robe, supra note 42, at 20. 
 77. See Judith Kaye, Lecture, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 743, 748 (2007) (describing MHCs as 
follows: “mental health courts, which . . . divert defendants from jail to treatment, reconnect them, 
where possible, with family and friends who care whether they live or die, . . . [and] restore their 
greatest loss—their sense of human dignity”). The author was the former Chief Judge of the New York 
Court of Appeals. 
 78. See Ginger Lerner-Wren, Broward’s Mental Health Court: An Innovative Approach to the 
Mentally Disabled in the Criminal Justice System, in FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 1999–2000 
(2000), http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/spcts/id/184; see also Boothroyd et 
al., supra note 56, at 57; Castellano, supra note 43, at 401 (“[A] hallmark feature of problem solving 
courts is that judges speak directly to offenders with empathy and enthusiasm.”).  
 On how judges in these courts “believe communicating directly to participants makes a 
difference in their lives,” see Castellano, supra note 43, at 402 (citing, inter alia, Myesa Knox 
Mahoney, Procedural Justice and the Judge–Probationer Relationship in a Co-Occurring Disorders 
Court, 37 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 260 (2014)). Of course, judges’ work in these courts contrasts 
sharply with the sort of “assembly-line justice” that they were pressured to administer when they 
worked in traditional courts. Castellano, supra note 43, at 401. Although the Supreme Court has 
disapproved of such “assembly-line justice,” see Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36, 58 (1972); 
it is still often a reality. See generally CAROL WARREN, THE COURT OF LAST RESORT: MENTAL 
ILLNESS AND THE LAW 191 (1984); Candace McCoy, The Politics of Problem-Solving: An Overview 
of the Origins and Developments of Therapeutic Courts, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1513 (2003). 
 79. Emily Buss, Developmental Jurisprudence, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 741, 750 (2016) (citing Shelli 
B. Rossman & Janine M. Zweig, What Have We Learned from the Multi-Site Adult Drug Court 
Evaluation? Implications for Policy, Practice, and Future Research, in 4 THE MULTI-SITE ADULT 
DRUG COURT EVALUATION: THE IMPACT OF DRUG COURTS 251, 259–60 (Shelli B. Rossman et al. 
eds., 2013), http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/MADCE_4.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/5ZP2-T3ST]; Peggy Fulton Hora & Theodore Stalcup, Drug Treatment Courts in the 
Twenty-First Century: The Evolution of the Revolution in Problem-Solving Courts, 42 GA. L. REV. 
717, 763–64 (2008). 
 80. Vicki Lens, Against the Grain: Therapeutic Judging in a Traditional Family Court, 41 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 701, 704 (2016). Beyond the scope of this paper is an evaluation of the potential role 
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Professor Ursula Castellano has thoughtfully and insightfully argued 
that for MHCs to be successful, the presiding judge need practice what she 
calls “the politics of benchcraft,”81 rising “to the larger challenges 
embedded in the alternative courtroom.”82 Such judges “selectively apply, 
blend and transform” elements from the treatment and legal spheres to 
adjudicate cases therapeutically and to “generate more effective 
solutions.”83 
In this context, it should be noted that studies of the MHCs referred 
to here conclude that such courts actually work as they are intended to.84 
Participants in Judge Ginger Lerner-Wren’s MHC had significantly lower 
arrest rates after enrollment in treatment programs than before enrollment 
and lower post-enrollment arrest rates than comparison groups; in fact, 
MHCs evaluated in a multi-site study85 “were more successful at reducing 
recidivism—recidivism rates of 25% versus 10%–15%”—than were drug 
courts.86 And these statistics are constant when juvenile MHCs are 
                                                     
of independent expert witnesses. On the use of such experts in traditional civil commitment cases, see 
supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text. Although one analysis of MHCs touts as a court advantage 
the “elimination of dueling experts,” see Andrew Wasicek, Mental Illness and Crime: Envisioning a 
Public Health Strategy and Reimagining Mental Health Courts, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. ART 6 (2012). 
And, in John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Taming Patent: Six Steps for Surviving Scary Patent Cases, 50 UCLA 
L. REV. 1413, 1426 (2003), one judge noted that in his court, at least, “[n]ot infrequently there can be 
a request for a second opinion[.]” However, there is virtually no research literature whatsoever on the 
use of independent experts in these courts. Professors Baker and Zawid note that “expert testimony is 
common in mental health courts,” but from the context of their article, they appear to be referring to 
testimony by team members, not independent expert witnesses. See Gregory Baker & Jennifer Zawid, 
The Birth of a Therapeutic Courts Externship Program: Hard Labor but Worth the Effort, 17 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 711, 739 (2005). 
 81. Castellano, supra note 43, at 403. She defines this, in part, as “learning to finesse elements 
of treatment and law into new professional practices.” Id. 
 82. Id. at 417. 
 83. Id. Professor Castellano, in her study of four separate MHCs, found that the judges she 
observed were “deeply involved in investigating problems, collecting personal client information, and 
actively consulting with treatment professionals and law enforcement offices.” Id. at 405. 
 84. These findings are not universal. I do have some concerns about the operationalization of the 
courts in some jurisdictions. See E. Lea Johnston & Conor Flynn, Mental Health Courts and 
Sentencing Disparities, 62 VILL. L. REV. 685, 693 (2017) (empirical study of MHCs in Erie County, 
PA, concluding that anticipated treatment court sentences—for all grades of offense—typically exceed 
county court sentences by more than a year). 
 85. Greg Goodale, Lisa Callahan & Henry J. Steadman, What Can We Say About Mental Health 
Courts Today? 64 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 298, 299 (2013) (citing, inter alia, Henry J. Steadman et 
al., Effect of Mental Health Courts on Arrests and Jail Days: A Multisite Study, 68 ARCHIVES GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 167, 167–72 (2011)). 
 86. Id. See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 1-2.2.3, at 1-32 to 1-33 n.194 (citing, inter alia, 
Leonora Kopelovich et al., Procedural Justice in Mental Health Courts: Judicial Practices, 
Participant Perceptions, and Outcomes Related to Mental Health Recovery, 36 INT’L J.L. & 
PSYCHIATRY 113 (2013)) (noting that procedural justice is positively correlated with participants’ 
attitudes toward their own recovery); Mark R. Munetz et al., Mental Health Court and Assisted 
Outpatient Treatment: Perceived Coercion, Procedural Justice, and Program Impact, 65 
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 352 (2014) (noting that mental health court graduates perceived significantly 
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studied.87 Research also suggests that mental health court participation 
increases access to and utilization of mental health care,88 reduces the use 
of crisis or high-intensity services, and reduces substance use.89 The most 
recent relevant study—authored by a sitting trial judge—has thus 
concluded that “[p]roblem-solving treatment courts are the best way to 
                                                     
less coercion and more procedural justice in court than did those involved in assisted outpatient 
treatment proceedings); Allison Redlich & Woojae Han, Examining the Links Between Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence and Mental Health Court Completion, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 109, 109 (2014) 
(noting that increased levels of procedural justice and perceived voluntariness led to decreased rates 
of new arrests in mental health court populations)); see also PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 4-3.3; 
Priscilla Ferrazzi & Terry Krupa, Mental Health Rehabilitation in Therapeutic Jurisprudence: 
Theoretical Improvements, 46 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 42 (2016) (arguing that greater consideration 
of mental health rehabilitation will improve the theoretical validity of therapeutic jurisprudence in this 
context); Evan Lowder, Sarah Desmarais & Daniel J. Baucom, Recidivism Following Mental Health 
Court Exit: Between and Within-Group Comparisons, 40 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 118, 118 (2016) 
(noting that MHCs are particularly effective for high-risk participants, and time spent in such courts 
has positive effects on recidivism). 
 On the role of perceived coercion in the mental health court process, see Boothroyd et al., supra 
note 56, at 68, and Poythress et al., supra note 76. But cf. Laura N. Honegger, Does the Evidence 
Support the Case for Mental Health Courts? A Review of the Literature, 39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 478, 
478 (2015) (noting that existing studies of MHCs suffer from methodological limitations—
specifically, a lack of experimental design, use of non-representative samples, and assessment over 
short timeframes); Evan M. Lowder, Candalyn B. Rade & Sarah L. Desmarais, Effectiveness of Mental 
Health Courts in Reducing Recidivism: A Meta-Analysis, 69 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 15 (2017), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28806894 [https://perma.cc/Q28H-L3R4] (finding that test 
results showed a small effect of MHC participation on recidivism relative to traditional criminal 
processing; yet, MHCs were most effective with respect to jail time and charge outcomes compared 
with arrest and conviction). 
 87. Donna M.L. Heretick & Joseph A. Russell, The Impact of Juvenile Mental Health Court on 
Recidivism Among Youth, 3 J. JUV. JUST. 1 (2013) (finding preliminary evidence that post-release 
recidivism rates of youth in the court were significantly lower than those for a sample of other youth 
in the juvenile justice system diagnosed with mental disorders). For a careful analysis of the 
differences between juvenile MHCs and traditional juvenile “guilty plea” courts, see Voula Marinos 
& Devon Gregory, The Tale of a Youth Guilty Plea Court & A Youth Mental Health Court in Ontario: 
How Different Are They in Practice?, 2 INT’L J. THERAPEUTIC JURIS. 25 (2016–2017) (Marinos, Tales 
of a Court), and Voula Marinos, Methodologies for the Study of TJ Processes or Procedural Justice 
Within the Operation of TJ-Related Courts: A Conversation (Oct. 15, 2016) (unpublished manuscript 
presented at the annual Therapeutic Jurisprudence Workshop at Osgoode Hall Law Sch., York 
University, Toronto, Ont., Can.) (PowerPoint slides on file with author). 
 88. See, e.g., Boothroyd et al., supra note 56, at 68; Andrea M. Odegaard, Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence: The Impact of Mental Health Courts on The Criminal Justice System, 83 N.D. L. REV. 
225, 231 (2007). See generally Woojae Han & Allison Redlich, The Impact of Community Treatment 
on Recidivism Among Mental Health Court Participants, 67 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 384 (2016) 
(noting that data showed increases in the receipt of community treatment among MHC participants 
and decreases in recidivism). 
 89. Kellie Canada, John Halloran & Clark M. Peters, The Emergence of Mental Health Courts 
in the United States: Intersecting Innovation Between Psychiatric Care and the Law, 5 MENTAL 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y J. 31, 57 (2016) (citing Erin Comartin et al., Short and Long-term Outcomes of 
Mental Health Court Participants by Psychiatric Diagnosis, 66 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 923, 926 
(2015); Kelly Fraling, How Mental Health Courts Function: Outcomes and Observations, 33 INT’L 
J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 207, 212 (2010)). 
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supervise criminal defendants in the community who present with high 
needs and a high risk to re-offend absent intervention.”90 
A. From the Perspective of Procedural Justice 
Consider both these court systems in the context of procedural 
justice.91 “Procedural justice” asserts that “people’s evaluations of the 
resolution of a dispute (including matters resolved by the judicial system) 
are influenced more by their perception of the fairness of the process 
employed than by their belief regarding whether the ‘right’ outcome was 
reached.”92 The research is consistent: “[T]he principal factor shaping 
[the] reactions [of the general public] is whether law enforcement officials 
exercise authority in ways that are perceived to be fair.”93 And, the fairness 
of the process used to reach a given outcome is critical to perceptions of 
legitimacy.94 The question to be asked is this: does the criminal justice 
system treat defendants fairly and respectfully regardless of the 
substantive outcome reached?95 
                                                     
 90. Kerry Meyer, Hennepin County Criminal Mental Health Court: Experiences in a Large 
Metropolitan Mental Health Court, 42 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 485, 521 (2016). On how MHCs 
in some states can vary radically from county to county, see Monte Staton & Arthur Lurigio, Mental 
Health Courts in Illinois: Comparing and Contrasting Program Models, Sanction Applications, 
Information Sharing, and Professional Roles, FED. PROB., June 2015, at 21. Of course, given the direct 
link with the criminal justice system, the potential power for coercion is certainly, at the least, a 
dormant issue. See, e.g., Stacey M. Faraci, Slip Slidin’ Away? Will Our Nation’s Mental Health Court 
Experiment Diminish the Rights of the Mentally Ill?, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 811, 853 (2004) (arguing 
that mental health court defendants “endure much more liberty restrictions and privacy intrusions” and 
that labeling the “sentence ‘treatment,’ rather than ‘punishment,’” allows the court to exert more 
coercion over the participant than would otherwise be available). See generally Johnston & Flynn, 
supra note 84 (reporting on negative mental health court data from one Pennsylvania county). I believe 
that when courts are modeled after the examples set by Judge Lerner-Wren, Judge D’Emic, and Judge 
Finkle, this will not happen. See Lerner-Wren, supra note 78, at 114–15. 
 91. The following section is generally adapted from PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY, 
supra note 50, ch. 6. 
 92. Hafemeister, Garner & Bath, supra note 50, at 200 (referencing, in part, Tom R. Tyler, 
Procedural Justice and the Courts, 44 CT. REV. 26, 26 (2007)); see also Larry Heuer, What’s Just 
About the Criminal Justice System? A Psychological Perspective, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 209, 213 (2005) 
(“[P]rocedural fairness concerns, rather than outcomes, are the best predictors of people’s trust and 
confidence in the courts.”). 
 93. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Tom R. Tyler & Aziz Z. Huq, American Policing at a Crossroads: 
Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 
346 (2011) (citing, inter alia, TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING 
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND THE LAW (2002); Kimberly Belvedere, John L. Worrall & 
Stephen G. Tibbetts, Explaining Suspect Resistance in Police-Citizen Encounters, 30 CRIM. JUST. 
REV. 30 (2005); Ben Bradford, Jonathan Jackson & Elizabeth A. Stanko, Contact and Confidence: 
Revisiting the Impact of Public Encounters with the Police, 19 POLICING AND SOC’Y 20 (2009)). 
 94. David Welsh, Procedural Justice Post-9/11: The Effects of Procedurally Unfair Treatment 
of Detainees on Perceptions of Global Legitimacy, 9 U. N.H. L. REV. 261, 274 (2011). 
 95. Erin A. Conway, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: How Illinois Has Used the “Prejudice” 
Prong of Strickland to Lower the Floor on Performance When Defendants Plead Guilty, 105 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1707, 1732 (2011). The same insights apply in non-criminal cases as well. See generally 
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When those affected by decision-making processes perceive the 
process to be just, “they are much more likely to accept the outcomes of 
the process, even when the outcomes are adverse.”96 Professor Tom 
Tyler’s groundbreaking research has taught us that individuals with mental 
disabilities, like all other citizens, are affected by such process values as 
participation, dignity, and trust, and that experiencing arbitrariness in 
procedure leads to “social malaise and decreases people’s willingness to 
be integrated into the polity, accepting its authorities and following its 
rules.”97 
“There is a growing body of research showing that the experience of 
procedural justice not only enhances evaluations of persons, institutions, 
and specific outcomes, but also leads to greater overall satisfaction with 
the legal experience and more positive affect with respect to an encounter 
with the justice system.”98 Perceptions of systemic fairness are driven, in 
large part, by “the degree to which people judge that they are treated with 
dignity and respect.”99 And, “[t]he public’s perception of procedural 
                                                     
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts, 63 
HASTINGS L.J. 127, 133–34 (2011) (footnotes omitted). 
Procedural justice research has shown that procedural justice effects are present in a wide 
range of settings. Civil litigants in court care about their treatment by a judge, criminal 
defendants care about their treatment by judge and jury, disputing parties in arbitration and 
mediation care about their treatment by an arbitrator or mediator, and even disputing parties 
in negotiation care about their treatment by the other party. Research outside the legal 
dispute resolution system has demonstrated that people care about their treatment by other 
authority figures, such as police officers, work supervisors, and health-care administrators. 
Beyond both the legal dispute-resolution context and the third party context, research has 
suggested that individuals care about procedural justice in highly relational settings like 
the family and even in classic economic settings like markets. Effects are found in field 
studies, simulations and experimental settings, and in situations with both low and very 
high stakes. 
Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 95, at 133–34. 
 96. Hafemeister, Garner & Bath, supra note 50, at 200 (quoting, in part, Michael M. O’Hear, 
Explaining Sentences, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 478 (2009)). This applies as well to psychiatric 
hospital decision-making. See Bruce J. Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approach to Dealing 
with Coercion in the Mental Health System, 15 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 25, 39 (2008) (discussing 
the importance of the “degree of respect” shown to patients by treatment providers). 
 97. Tom Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil 
Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 443 (1992) (as discussed in Perlin & Dorfman, supra 
note 21, at 119); see also Vidis Donnelly et al., Working Alliances, Interpersonal Trust and Perceived 
Coercion in Mental Health Review Hearings, 5 INT’L J. MENTAL HEALTH 29, 29 (2011) (noting that 
hearings perceived as lacking in procedural justice worsened working alliances between patients and 
physicians and diminished interpersonal trust) (cases heard in Ireland); Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 44 (1999) 
(noting that increasing a patient’s “sense of participation, dignity, and trust” during a civil commitment 
proceeding will “increase his or her acceptance of the outcome of the hearing”). 
 98. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 70 
(1988). 
 99. Perlin, supra note 9, at 415 (quoting Tyler, supra note 96, at 442). See generally P. 
Christopher Earley & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice and Participation in Task Selection: The Role 
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justice—whether the criminal justice system treats defendants fairly and 
respectfully regardless of the substantive outcome reached—determines 
the public’s willingness to engage in and comply with the system.”100 
The procedural justice differences between traditional civil 
commitment courts—dark, “greased runways” with disinterested judges 
and lawyers101—and modern MHCs—dignity-enforcing and coercion-
avoiding—could not be starker.102 In a thoughtful article about the role of 
procedural justice in the civil commitment process, Brian McKenna and 
his colleagues note “the clinical and ethical importance of procedural 
justice principles in the enactment of civil commitment,” stressing that 
“these principles involve allowing patients to have their say, listening to 
them seriously, providing patients with information and treating them with 
concern, fairness and respect.”103 The late Professor Bruce Winick has 
observed that “[p]erhaps nothing can threaten a person’s belief that he or 
she is an equal member of society as much as being subjected to a civil 
commitment hearing” and, in this context, when “legal proceedings do not 
treat people with dignity, they feel devalued as members of society.”104 
                                                     
of Control in Mediating Justice Judgments, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1148 (1987); Emily 
Gottfried, Joyce Carbonell & Lauren Miller, The Impact of Judge–Defendant Communication on 
Mental Health Court Outcomes, 37 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 253 (2014) (“Mental health courts 
generally operate under the principle of treating defendants with mental disorders with respect and 
dignity, something that is perhaps missing from traditional court proceedings.”); Norman G. 
Poythress, Procedural Preferences, Perceptions of Fairness, and Compliance with Outcomes, 18 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 361 (1994). 
 100. Conway, supra note 95, at 1732 (citing LIND & TYLER, supra note 98, at 76–81). 
 101. On how the lawyers who represent patients in such courts often exhibit the worst of sanism, 
see generally Perlin, Could Be Your Funeral, supra note 10; Perlin, supra note 17. Although, state 
laws promise dignity in such proceedings. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-65-101 (West 2016) 
as discussed in People v. In Interest of Vivekanathan, 338 P.3d 1017, 1025 (Colo. Ct. App. 2013) 
(civil commitment procedures must “provide the fullest possible measure of privacy, dignity, and other 
rights to persons undergoing care and treatment for mental illness”), this promise is often not met.. 
 102. See Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Action, INT’L SOC’Y FOR 
THERAPEUTIC JURIS. (Sept. 5, 2015), https://mainstreamtj.wordpress.com/2015/09/05/therapeutic-
jurisprudence-in-action/ [https://perma.cc/9H6Y-NMEX] (discussing my experiences observing top-
flight problem-solving courts in New Zealand and concluding that “I have never, in such a short period 
of time, had the honor to observe such examples of therapeutic jurisprudence in action”). I discuss this 
further in Perlin & Lynch, Mr. Bad Example, supra note 5, at 314–15. 
 103. Brian G. McKenna, Alexander I.F. Simpson & John H. Coverdale, What Is the Role of 
Procedural Justice in Civil Commitment? 34 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 671, 675 (2000). Judges 
rarely listen to patients in traditional civil commitment courts. For a rare judicial exception, see Rennie 
v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1306 (D.N.J. 1979) (citing Theodore Van Putten & R.A. May, Subjective 
Response as a Predictor of Outcome in Pharmacotherapy, 35 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 477, 480 
(1978) (“Schizophrenics have been asked every question except, ‘How does the medication agree with 
you?’ Their response is worth listening to.”), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1983), vacated & 
remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982). 
 104. Winick, supra note 96, at 44–45. Importantly, this observation of Winick’s was relied on 
by the Montana Supreme Court in In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485, 495 (Mont. 2001), a 
commitment case that I have previously referred to as “the most important case ever litigated in this 
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Nearly forty years ago, John Ensminger and Thomas Liguori wrote that 
the civil commitment process had great therapeutic potential, stressing that 
such hearings optimally give patients an opportunity to present and hear 
evidence in a meaningful court procedure.105 The traditional civil 
commitment court does not give patients the opportunities highlighted by 
McKenna and his colleagues, by Winick, and by Ensminger and Liguori; 
however, the well-functioning mental health court does.106 
B. From the Perspective of Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
Consider next both these court systems in the context of therapeutic 
jurisprudence.107 Therapeutic jurisprudence presents a model for assessing 
the impact of case law and legislation, recognizing that, as a therapeutic 
agent, the law can have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences. “The 
ultimate aim of therapeutic jurisprudence is to determine whether legal 
rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to enhance 
their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due process 
principles.”108 
In the context of this paper, consider the impact of therapeutic 
jurisprudence specifically in the context of (1) the extent to which “legal 
rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to enhance 
their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due process 
                                                     
area.” Perlin, Could Be Your Funeral, supra note 10, at 246. Recently, however, this case—which had 
found that the “adequacy of counsel” standard established by the U.S. Supreme Court for criminal 
cases was inadequate for civil commitment cases—was partially overruled in Matter of J.S., 401 P.3d 
197 (Mont. 2017), calling for adherence to the Strickland standard. 
 105. John J. Ensminger & Thomas D. Liguori, The Therapeutic Significance of the Civil 
Commitment Hearing: An Unexplored Potential, 6 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5 (1978), reprinted in Wexler, 
THERAPEUTIC AGENT, supra note 7, at 245, 251–58. I discuss these insights, inter alia, in Perlin, supra 
note 20, at 742. On how formal hearings may force individuals before the court to “face reality,” see 
Jennifer Fischer, A Comparative Look at the Right to Refuse Treatment for Involuntarily Hospitalized 
Persons with a Mental Illness, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 153, 159 (2006). 
 106. On the significance of dignity values in involuntary civil commitment hearings, see 
Deborah A. Dorfman, Effectively Implementing Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act for 
Mentally Disabled Persons: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 105, 121 (1994), 
and Tyler, supra note 97, at 444–45. On how it is more likely in a well-functioning juvenile mental 
health court that those before the court will be consulted about decisions made about them, see 
Marinos, Tales of a Court, supra note 87. 
 107. See generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 3, § 2-6, 2-43 to 2-66; DAVID B. WEXLER & 
BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC 
JURISPRUDENCE (1996); Wexler, THERAPEUTIC AGENT, supra note 7; BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL 
COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL (2005); David B. Wexler, Two Decades of 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24 TOURO L. REV. 17 (2008). Wexler first used the term in a paper he 
presented to the National Institute of Mental Health in 1987. See David B. Wexler, Putting Mental 
Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 27, 32–33 
(1992). 
 108. Perlin, Cast His Robe, supra note 42, at 7–8 (footnotes omitted). 
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principles,”109 (2) how the law “actually impacts people’s lives,”110 (3) 
whether the court system supports an “ethic of care,”111 and (4) the extent 
to which the legal system abides by the “three Vs” articulated by Professor 
Amy Ronner: voice, validation, and voluntariness.112 It is important to note 
that in his analysis of these issues, Professor Winick considered both 
individuals’ emotional life and psychological well-being.113 
I am struck with an anomaly that is at the core of this paper: civil 
commitment courts are—virtually across the board—the antithesis of 
therapeutic jurisprudence, in stark contrast to the TJ-modeling MHCs of 
the sort presided over by Judge Wren (and others, e.g., Judge Matthew 
                                                     
 109. Perlin & Lynch, supra note 75, at 213; see also Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “In 
the Wasteland of Your Mind”: Criminology, Scientific Discoveries and the Criminal Process, 4 VA. 
J. CRIM. L. 304 (2016). The author has been considering these questions for over two decades. See 
Michael L. Perlin, What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence? 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623 (1993). 
 110. Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing with 
Victims of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009). I discuss this insight, inter alia, in Perlin & 
Lynch, supra note 109, at 349, and Michael L. Perlin, “Yonder Stands Your Orphan with His Gun”: 
The International Human Rights and Therapeutic Jurisprudence Implications of Juvenile Punishment 
Schemes, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 301, 331 (2013). 
 111. Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical Framework, 8 J.L. 
& MED. 328, 334 (2001); see also David B. Wexler, Not Such a Party Pooper: An Attempt to 
Accommodate (Many of) Professor Quinn’s Concerns About Therapeutic Jurisprudence Criminal 
Defense Lawyering, 48 B.C. L. REV. 597, 599 (2007). 
 112. Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education and Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOURO L. REV. 601, 627 (2008). According to 
Professor Ronner: 
What “the three Vs” commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a sense of voice or a 
chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that litigant feels that the tribunal has 
genuinely listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant’s story, the litigant feels a 
sense of validation. When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice 
and validation, they are more at peace with the outcome. Voice and validation create a 
sense of voluntary participation, one in which the litigant experiences the proceeding as 
less coercive. Specifically, the feeling on the part of litigants that they voluntarily partook 
in the very process that engendered the end result or the very judicial pronunciation that 
affects their own lives can initiate healing and bring about improved behavior in the future. 
In general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are making, or at least 
participating in, their own decisions. 
Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 
Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 94–95 (2002) [hereinafter Ronner, Songs of Validation]. 
On how mental health court judges are expected “to practice law as a healing profession,” see 
Castellano, supra note 43, at 400. On the law and healing in a mental disability context generally, see 
Perlin, supra note 9. I discuss Ronner’s insights in this context in Perlin, Cast His Robe, supra note 
42, at 8–9. 
 113. Winick, supra note 110, at 535; see also David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Putting 
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D’Emic in Brooklyn114 and Judge Michael Finkle in Seattle115). MHCs—
when structured properly and when chaired by a judge who “buys into” 
the TJ model—are perfect exemplars of the practical utility of therapeutic 
jurisprudence.116 As one commentator has noted, therapeutic 
jurisprudence “has expanded the role of courts to include a rehabilitative 
process.”117 
The promotion and creation of such courts are consistent with TJ’s 
aims and aspirations,118 especially where litigants are given the “voice” 
that TJ demands.119 The courts are grounded120 and rooted121 in TJ; they 
reflect TJ “theory in practice;”122 and they acknowledge that a defendant’s 
appearance in such a court comes at a “painful and crucial point in life.”123 
But these TJ-friendly, TJ-inspiring, and TJ-enforcing courts—courts that, 
better than any others, provide an environment that is not stigmatizing and 
not sanist124—have had no impact at all on the “greased runways” of the 
courts, where litigation is done in “pitch darkness.”125 
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In a book and in a series of recent papers, I have focused on the need 
for dignity in the legal process in cases involving persons with mental 
disabilities.126 One of the central principles of TJ is a commitment to 
dignity.127 With my colleagues, Keri Gould and Deborah Dorfman, I have 
concluded that “[t]he perception of receiving a fair hearing is therapeutic 
because it contributes to the individual’s sense of dignity and conveys that 
he or she is being taken seriously.”128 In a recent article about dignity and 
the civil commitment process, Professors Jonathan Simon and Stephen 
Rosenbaum embrace therapeutic jurisprudence as a modality of analysis 
and focus specifically on this issue of voice: “When procedures give 
people an opportunity to exercise voice, their words are given respect, 
decisions are explained to them their views taken into account, and they 
substantively feel less coercion.”129 With my colleague Naomi Weinstein, 
I have recently argued that “attorneys must embrace the principles and 
tenets of therapeutic jurisprudence as a means of best ensuring the dignity 
of their clients and of maximizing the likelihood that voice, validation and 
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voluntariness130 will be enhanced.”131 I believe that rejecting the traditional 
civil commitment court model and embracing the modern mental health 
court model is the single-best way that this dignity can be provided.132 
III. CONCLUSION 
There are other issues to consider as well. Although a robust 
literature has developed about MHCs, and although researchers have 
begun to focus on a broad-range of empirical issues, such as the extent to 
which defendants are competent to waive their trial rights in such settings, 
the quality of counsel, the significance of diversion, etc.,133 there is still 
virtually nothing in the legal literature on these precise questions in this 
context.134 Bruce Winick has sketched the outlines of what lawyers must 
                                                     
 130. See Ronner, Songs of Validation, supra note 112. Ironically, and importantly, a “voluntary” 
status in mental health commitment is not always truly voluntary. On the ways that hospital staff can 
routinely manipulate such disparity in bargaining to coerce patients into accepting voluntary 
commitment status (thus avoiding court hearings), see Susan Reed & Dan Lewis, The Negotiation of 
Voluntary Admission in Chicago’s State Mental Hospitals, 18 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 137, 143–48 
(1990); see also Joel Haycock et al., Mediating the Gap: Thinking About Alternatives to the Current 
Practice of Civil Commitment, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 265, 278 (1994) 
(“[The patient’s lawyers], in collusion with the care-givers, disempower him or her and effectively 
thwart the establishment of a voluntary treatment compact between the patient and mental health 
professionals.”). 
 131. Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 40, at 115. 
 132. See generally David Yamada, Dignity, “Rankism,” and Hierarchy in the Workplace: 
Creating a “Dignitarian” Agenda for American Employment Law, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
305 (2007) (reviewing ROBERT W. FULLER, ALL RISE: SOMEBODIES, NOBODIES, AND THE POLITICS 
OF DIGNITY (2006), and ROBERT W. FULLER, DIGNITY FOR ALL: HOW TO CREATE A WORLD WITHOUT 
RANKISM (2008)). I am grateful to Professor Yamada for introducing me to the work of Professor 
Fuller. 
 133. Perlin, Cast His Robe, supra note 42, at 16–17 (discussing, among other things, Steven 
Erickson et al., Variations in Mental Health Courts: Challenges, Opportunities, and a Call for 
Caution, 42 COMM. MENTAL HEALTH J. 335, 339 (2006); Faraci, supra note 90, at 828–29 (discussing 
competency of defendants to accept transfer to MHCs)); see also Terry Carney, The Mental Health 
Service Crisis of Neoliberalism—An Antipodean Perspective, 31 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 101, 111 
(2008) (discussing competency of counsel assigned to defendants in MHCs); Erickson et al., supra 
note 133, at 340; Allison D. Redlich, Voluntary, but Knowing and Intelligent?, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 605 (2005) (discussing competency of MHC defendants to fully comprehend court 
processes and requirements). 
 134. I believe the questions that I have raised about quality of counsel in the representation of 
criminal defendants with mental disabilities in the criminal justice system in PERLIN, supra note 19, 
must be considered in the context of MHCs, but I know of no scholarly research in the legal literature 
that has focused on these issues. See Michael L. Perlin, “Wisdom Is Thrown into Jail”: Using 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Remediate the Criminalization of Persons with Mental Illness, 17 MICH. 
ST. U. J.L. & MED. 343, 368–69 (2013) [hereinafter Perlin, Wisdom Is Thrown] (raising this issue); 
Michael L. Perlin, “To Show That . . . the Courts Are on the Level”: Addressing Questions of 
Competency and Adequacy of Counsel in Mental Health Courts (Nov. 2016) (unpublished manuscript 
presented to the American Society of Criminology, New Orleans, La.) (PowerPoint on file with 
author). 
962 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 41:937 
do in the representation of clients in these courts,135 but little scholarly 
attention has been given to a range of important issues that affect the 
operation of these courts and the role of lawyers representing clients in 
them.136 Even a TJ-centric court will only be able to do so much if we do 
not take seriously questions as to the adequacy of counsel in this specific 
context. For it is fair process norms, such as the right to counsel, that 
“operate as substantive and procedural restraints on state power to ensure 
that the individual suspect is treated with dignity and respect.”137 And if 
this right is ensured, then and only then will courts administering civil 
commitment proceedings live up to their potential. 
The title of this paper draws on Bob Dylan’s song, Ring Them 
Bells,138 and is found in the fourth line of this stanza: 
Ring them bells for the blind and the deaf 
Ring them bells for all of us who are left 
Ring them bells for the chosen few 
Who will judge the many when the game is through139 
Here, Dylan sings of the bells ringing for others with disabilities 
(“the blind and the deaf”) and those who are outsiders (“us who are left”). 
According to the preeminent Dylanologist Oliver Trager, the song 
“ach[es] with compassion,”140 and I think that is appropriate for use in this 
paper. Therapeutic jurisprudence “ach[es] with compassion.” Traditional 
civil commitment courts make me ache with sadness. I am hoping that 
some of the TJ spirit that imbues successful MHCs will eventually be 
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shared with those traditional civil commitment courts to bring some light 
to the darkness that still envelops them. 
